I. INTRODUCTION
The first massive high rate flooding attack happened at commercial organizations such as CNN, yahoo, etc., in the year 2000. Since then, these attacks are considered to be pernicious threat to the Internet Services. The attack rate has increased to 100 Gbps as is evident from the Arbor Networks Survey Report [1] . Majority of the attack traffic reported in [2] are TCP SYN flood (33.8%), UDP flood (32.5%), and DNS flood (9.5%). The destination server alone is not affected by these high rate flooding attacks. Also, other infrastructure elements such as routers, switches, etc., suffer collateral damage along the path of an attack. Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack is broadly classified into resource depletion and bandwidth depletion attack [3] . In resource depletion attack, attackers attempt to tie up the critical resources (memory and processor) making the victim unable to process the legitimate service. In bandwidth depletion attack, attackers flood the victim with large traffic that prevents the legitimate traffic and amplifies the attack by sending messages to broadcast IP address. A flood attack involves the zombies sending large volumes of traffic (UDP or ICMP) to a victim system, to congest the victim system's bandwidth.
High rate flooding attacks such as HTTP flood, SYN flood, and UDP flood have been posing a serious threat to Web servers, DNS servers, Mail servers, VoIP servers, etc. Though the critical services are well protected by Firewall and Antivirus software, attackers exploit the application vulnerabilities to target the server. Also, Firewall itself falls victim to such high rate flooding attacks leading to poor performance in offering firewall services and consequently bringing down the performance/services of a network. Today, attackers find it tedious to perform network layer attacks as the current defense mechanisms are efficient enough to filter or rate limit the attack traffic. As new applications are evolving in the internet on a daily basis, the vulnerabilities are also increasing leading to application layer based attacks. Attackers use the vulnerabilities present in the new applications and exploit the server completely. Nowadays, by disabling IP broadcasts in Firewalls, host computers prevent amplification in ICMP Flood and Smurf attacks. Though some of the DDoS attacks and attack tools have become obsolete now and some of the old attacks are detected by existing defense mechanisms, the attacker still changes the attack techniques using new attack tools, varies the traffic pattern, and deluges the traffic to shutdown the target server. This is a challenging issue as existing detection mechanisms are not capable of detecting zero-day attacks. Also, Source and Destination IP addresses are spoofed. Therefore, it is tedious to find the true origin of the attack.
Misuse detection methods identify packets that match a known pattern or signature. However, these methods fail to detect unknown anomalies. Anomaly detection methods are used to identify the traffic patterns that The challenge in these systems is how efficiently rules are generated. Prior knowledge of the attacks and its behavior are required for rule generation. These systems may not detect new attacks. Hence, existing detection algorithms for high rate flooding attacks in the literature suffer from more false positives and less detection accuracy. Cost of misclassifications varies depending on the application. In intrusion detection, cost of unauthorized user attempting to exploit the root access is more expensive than the user doing scanning activities such as port scan. Hence, cost of false alarms is important in intrusion detection systems. To minimize the false alarms, Neyman Pearson approach [9] is used in the post training process to select the classifiers with high detection accuracy. Existing detection mechanisms have focused mostly in the classification of network traffic into normal and attack classes. But, in this paper, identification of type of flooding attacks has been focused, besides classification of network traffic. Therefore, it is useful for administrators to take appropriate action on the server in less time. For example, if attack type is identified as HTTP flood, it means Webserver with port 80 or 443 is under attack. Therefore, administrator filters or rate limits the malicious requests passing through this port. From source end, launching such attacks is done by different techniques, viz., sending SMS, injecting flood scripts in browser, attaching malicious URL shortening link in facebook, etc. But, whatever may be the techniques and technologies from source end, the requests finally arrive at the target server. Hence, a victim or target based detection solution is proposed in this paper.
The contributions of this paper include the following: 
II. RELATED WORKS
Since 2000, the three publicly available datasets for intrusion detection are the DARPA/Lincoln Labs packet traces, the KDD Cup dataset [10] derived from DARPA traces, and Cooperative Association for Internet Data Analysis (CAIDA) [11] , [12] . There were criticisms on DARPA data [13] . The KDD Cup dataset was created by processing the tcpdump portions of the 1998 DARPA Intrusion Detection System (IDS) Evaluation dataset. CAIDA dataset is available by user request. The reason for the lack of public DDoS attack datasets is that the deep inspection of network traffic reveals highly sensitive information such as confidential communications, user's network access patterns, etc. Any breach of such information can be disastrous for both the organization and service providers. Solution is to create synthetic data through simulation, emulation, or anonymization of shared real time datasets. Thus, we have generated our own dataset in a distributed testbed using new attack tools and used the same for the experiments on classification and identification.
Constructing the features is integrated into the preprocessing stage which includes standardization, normalization, etc. Feature Selection is divided into Filter methods and wrapper methods [14] . In filter methods, selection is based on distance and information measures in the feature space. In wrapper methods, selection is based on classifier accuracy. In this paper, wrapper method has been used for the feature selection. If too many features exist, the learned hypothesis may fit the training set very well, but fails to generalize the new examples. In [15] , 248 features were given and 1 feature was used to describe the class (normal or attack). Computation of all the 248 features [16] Machine Learning is mostly focused on finding relationships in data and analyzing the process for extracting such relations. Machine learning paradigms are classified as Supervised Learning (SL) and Unsupervised Learning (UL). In SL, the algorithm attempts to learn some function with given input vector and actual output. In UL, the algorithm attempts to learn only with given input vector by identifying relationships among data. Several Machine Learning (ML) algorithms have been proposed [9] , [17] , [18] , [19] , [20] , [21] , [22] for DDoS attack detection. These ML algorithms applied to DDoS attack detection have not considered identifying the type of flooding attack. Some algorithms [23] , [24] have been used to classify the instances into multiple classes such as Normal, Probe, DoS, U2R, and R2L. But, the datasets (KDD Cup'99) used in these algorithms are obsolete. In [23] , the threshold values are used in the decision making process to identify the different classes. However, more number of features such as intrinsic, content, and traffic features have been used in [23] , [24] . Solutions proposed for multiclass problem may not be applicable to binary classification problem. Hence, none of the methods have focused explicitly in identifying the type of high rate flooding attack. In this paper, the existing Machine Learning algorithms, viz., Multi Layer Perceptron [25] , Support Vector Machine [26] , K-Nearest Neighbor [27] , Decision tree (C4.5) [28] , and Naïve Bayes [29] have been used for the experiments.
Single classifier makes error on different training samples. So, by creating an ensemble of classifiers and combining their outputs, the total error can be reduced and the detection accuracy can be increased. In [30] , [31] , the potential of high-performance parallel processors is exploited to operate several anomaly detection algorithms in parallel. Hence, the output from each algorithm is normalized and then aggregated to produce a single anomaly metric. Bagging [32] , Boosting [33] , and AdaBoost [33] are the existing ensemble algorithms used for pattern classification. Decision boundaries of each classifier have to be uniquely different from others. To achieve this diversity, ensemble of classifiers can be constructed by manipulating training data, feature sets, and injecting randomness. Existing ensemble algorithms achieve classifier diversity by manipulating the training dataset over the same feature space. In this paper, ensemble construction by manipulating feature sets was chosen, as it would correctly detect the deviations and identify the type of attack as each classifier is trained with the different dataset and an expert in local feature space. In order to construct the ensemble by manipulating input feature sets, the input feature set is divided into smaller feature subsets and each classifier is trained with the smaller feature subsets.
Classifier combination is divided into two categories:
• Classifier selection, where each classifier is trained to become an expert in some local area of the total feature space.
• Classifier fusion, where all classifiers are trained over the same feature space. In this paper, classifier selection has been used. Selection of output combination method depends on the nature of the input classifiers and the feature space. Classifier outputs can be combined by methods such as Maximum rule [34] , Minimum rule (WMV) [34] , Product rule [35] , Mean [35] , etc. By combining expert learning systems, the ensemble model accuracy is always improved comparing to single-model solutions. In [35] , sum rule outperformed the other existing combination rules in classifying the handwritten digit recognition. Majority vote and Sum rule are the output combination rules used mostly in the literature for pattern classification and it has achieved high detection accuracy. If existing combination rules are used, one or two classifier decisions may be ignored. But, in this paper, each classifier decision is significant in the ensemble and hence cannot be ignored. Borda Count [34] also gives importance to each classifier decision, in particular it provides support to the non-winning class. But, it will be useful for multiclass problems. In case of binary classification problems, Borda Count is similar to Simple Majority Voting. Hence, Borda Count is not suitable for identifying the type of flooding attack. In this paper, it has been experimentally proved that none of the existing rules were able to classify the samples correctly and these existing rules produced less detection accuracy than the single classifier model. Hence, a novel ensemble output decision rule, Preferential Agreement, has been proposed in this paper.
III. DESIGN OF PROPOSED M 2 KMIX ALGORITHM
The proposed M 2 KMix based Ensemble system consists of the following two stages:
• Preprocessing • Classification
A. Preprocessing
Preprocessing refers to the process of extracting information about packets from network traffic for the construction of new statistical features. In preprocessing module as shown in Figure 1 , different feature subsets are selected for the identification of different attacks. The input to the preprocessing module is the network traffic consisting of both labeled normal and labeled attack dataset. The output of this module is normalized dataset. The preprocessing steps are explained as follows:
• The captured network traffic consisting of labeled normal and labeled flooding attacks is split into different attack type datasets such as SYN flood, UDP flood, and HTTP flood as shown in Figure 1 , Stage I. The splitting of datasets into three subsets has been implemented in this paper as the scope of attack type classification is restricted to SYN flood, UDP flood, and HTTP flood.
• The split datasets are given as an input to the feature extraction module to extract the feature values, as shown in Figure 1 , Stage E. These features quantify the behavioral characteristics of a connection in terms of ratio and number of various data items with respect to time.
• The features present in Table I • Normalization is a process of ensuring that each attribute value in a database is suitable for further querying, which is free from certain undesirable characteristics and eliminates the effect of scale difference.
• The extracted features as shown in Table I and its values are input to the normalization module as shown in Figure 1 , Stage N.
• The feature values are scaled to the range [0, 1] using (1), where 'i (t)' denotes the value of the feature, 'min (i)' denotes the minimum value, and 'max (i)' denotes the maximum value. Thus, data available for the classifier are real numbers between 0 and 1, Stage NM.
• These normalized three matrix files are saved as syn.mat, udp.mat, and http.mat as shown in Figure 1 and given as input to the machine learning algorithm. Thus, all the .mat files consist of normalized values between 0 and 1, Stage O. Figure 2 shows the training module of the M 2 KMix algorithm. The output, syn.mat file of the preprocessing module consisting of normalized feature values is given as input to the classification algorithms, viz., C 1 , C 2 , …, C 5 , where C1, … C5 represents Machine Learning algorithms such as Decision tree (C4.5) [28] (C1), Support Vector Machine [26] (C2), Multi Layer Perceptron [25] (C3), K-Nearest Neighbor [27] (C4), and Naïve Bayes [29] (C5). Similarly, udp.mat and http.mat files are also given as input to the classification algorithms, viz., C 1 , C 2 , …, C 5 . In this paper, the attack type identification is restricted to the three flooding attacks such as SYN flood, UDP flood, and HTTP flood. Proposed classification algorithm, M2KMix, is shown in Figure 3 .
B. Design of Proposed Classification Algorithm -M 2 KMix

B.1 TRAINING
First dataset (DS1) consists of TCP SYN, TCP SYN+ACK, TCP ACK attack traffic, and normal traffic. Second dataset (DS2) consists of UDP flood traffic and normal traffic. Third dataset (DS3) consists of HTTP and HTTPS attack traffic and normal traffic. Samples are chosen randomly from DS1, the first algorithm (C1) is trained, and the hypothesis h m is obtained. The error of h m is computed using equation (2) as shown in Figure 3 .
(2) If the computed error is greater than false alarm threshold value, then the hypothesis is dropped. If the computed error is less than false alarm threshold value, the normalized error is calculated using (3) .
[ As mentioned in the Neyman Pearson Statistical approach [36] (NeP), the total number of misclassified samples from both the classes for the specific algorithm is calculated using (4). R jm (h) = 1/n j ∑ I {h m (i) ≠ j} (4) All learning algorithm's True Negative (TN), True Positive (TP), False Positive (FP), False Negative (FN), and normalized error for this DS 1 are computed. Similarly, the above training steps are carried out for the other four algorithms for the same dataset DS 1 . Then, using equation (5), optimum threshold is decided from the given set of classifiers based on minimum false alarms. h m * = arg min {R jm (h): h H 0 } (5) The classifier that gives the minimum false alarms and high detection accuracy is chosen as the best learning algorithm, C S , for the detection of SYN flood. For the remaining datasets (DS2 and DS3), the best learning algorithms, C U and C H , are chosen in a similar manner as shown in Figure 2 . Hence, the output of the training phase yields the best learning algorithms, C S , C U , and C H for the three types of attacks considered.
B.2 TESTING
The Preprocessing stages, I, E, MR, N, NM, and O in Figure 4 perform the same function as in Figure 1 . The preprocessing module for testing phase prepares the data for attack type identification proposed using Preferential Agreement (PA) rule. Proposed PA rule is shown in Figure 5 Figure 7 is the same in all the sites. Target server was configured in Site 4. There were three client machines in each site where one client machine was used for generating normal traffic and other two were used for generating attack traffic. In a single client machine, many virtual clients were created with spoofed and random IP addresses to generate attack traffic using Netwag tool [38] . HTTP traffic was generated using HTTPTrafficGen [39] , a HTTP load generation tool, and using Low Orbit Ion cannon Tool [40] . Normal traffic consists of FTP access, webpage access, DNS requests and replies, e-mail access, video conferencing (UDP traffic), etc. Client machines were laptops and desktops. Attacks were launched on the web server present in Site 4. Traces were collected in Site 4 in tcpdump format. TCP port (80) traffic was generated by the clients in all sites including target server site. The traffic was collected during working hours. Simulations and the analysis of experimental data were performed with the use of MATLAB. Learning algorithms such as Multi Layer Perceptron-Resilient Back Propagation (MLP-RBP), Support Vector Machine (SVM), K-Nearest Neighbor, Naïve Bayes, and Decision Trees (C4.5) were used for training and testing the different attack datasets. The objective is to find the best classifier for each attack type and to identify the attack type during test run. Hence, these learning algorithms were trained with different attack datasets. And for each dataset, the learning algorithm that produced high Detection Accuracy and fewer False Alarms was chosen as a best classifier by NeP and added to the ensemble. Further, the attack type is identified by our proposed novel Preferential Agreement rule. Confusion matrix is shown in Table II . For the simulation experiments conducted, detection accuracy was calculated using (6). 
A. Exp. 1: Selection of best classifier for SYN flood dataset (DS1)
Different attacks were generated in different time period. Total number of connections is listed in Table III for different experiments. From Table III , it can be seen that for experiment 1, both attack and normal traffic were generated for a period of 30 minutes where 368,648 packets were captured at a packet rate of 200 packets/second approximately. Similarly, the number of connections for Exp. 2 and Exp. 3 are shown in Table III . Five classification algorithms were tested and the results are tabulated in Table IX. A set T of training data consists of 2 classes. A test based on feature F i of the training data was split into subsets. C4.5 selects the next attribute (based on a greedy principle) according to the information gain measure. C4.5 finds the normalized information gain for each feature. In the tree structure, each leaf node represents a classification decision and each internal node evaluates the corresponding attribute. Objective is to minimize the number of nodes that produced misclassifications. Confusion matrix values obtained during the experiments for C4.5 Decision tree are shown in Table IV . From the experiments, the detection accuracy achieved for the best decision tree classifier was seen to be 91.3%.
For problems that cannot be linearly separated in the input space, SVM performs a mapping from the input space to higher dimensional feature space through the use of a kernel function, where an optimally separating hyperplane is determined. In our experiments, the kernel function used for SVM was Radial Basis function (RBF) [25] which is a feed forward neural network. RBF networks are nonlinear hybrid networks consisting of single hidden layer processing elements. It uses Gaussian transfer function (which varies from 0 to 1 over the same range with a maximum at 0) than sigmoid function (which varies from -1 to +1 over a range of -∞ to +∞) which was used in MLP. The clusters used during each simulation were 8, 16, 32, and 64. From the simulation, it was observed that the model with 10 neurons in hidden layer, 16 clusters, and learning rate = 0.1 performs best in terms of detection accuracy. Confusion matrix values obtained during the experiments for SVM are shown in Table V . From the experiments, the detection accuracy achieved for SVM classifier was seen to be 86.7%.
A three layer MLP neural network was simulated. The number of neurons in the input layer was 2 (equal to number of features). Number of neurons in the output layer (sigmoid function) was 2 (normal and attack type). From the simulation experiments, it was found that the Resilient Back Propagation algorithm performed well in classifying the patterns. Initial weights were randomly assigned. Each epoch consisted of both normal and attack connection records.
Simulation experiments were carried out to find the number of nodes in hidden layer by varying the values from 10 to 40 in increments of 10. The learning rate parameter (L r ) determines how fast the system should adapt to new instances. A higher value of L r puts more weight on the instance and puts less weight on the existing instances. The performance is evaluated by varying the L r from 0.1 to 1.0. Confusion matrix values obtained during experiments for MLP are shown in Table VI . From the experiments conducted, it was inferred that lower L r values produced less false positive rate and less detection accuracy. Higher L r values produced more false positive rates and stable detection accuracy. It was observed that the model with 10 neurons in hidden layer with learning rate = 0.1 produces detection accuracy of 95.3% with less false alarms.
In Naïve Bayes conditional independence and training data, the probabilities of a packet belonging to normal or attack class are computed. If the probability that a packet belongs to normal class is more than attack class, then the packet is classified as normal class. It distinguishes the normal and attack traffic packets by its conditional probabilities. For each feature, it estimated a classconditional distribution using a histogram. Assuming independence of features, the per-class output was computed as a product of per-feature class conditional densities. Confusion matrix values obtained during the experiments for Naïve Bayes are shown in Table VII . From the experiments conducted, the detection accuracy was seen to be 90.3 %. Simulation experiments were conducted and from the results obtained, it can be seen from 
B. Exp. 2: Selection of best classifier for UDP flood dataset (DS2)
The second experiment was conducted to select the classifier that performed best in identifying the UDP flood attacks. The experiments conducted in this Section are similar to the experiments conducted in Section IV.A with a difference in inputs. Inputs given to the classifiers are the normal traffic and UDP flood attack traffic dataset. Each classifier is trained and tested with the same inputs. The same five classification algorithms were tested and the results are tabulated in Table XV . C4.5 finds the normalized information gain for each feature. Confusion matrix values obtained during the experiments for C4.5 are shown in Table X . From the experiments, the detection accuracy achieved for the best decision tree classifier was seen to be 88%. In SVM, the clusters used during each simulation were 8, 16, 32, and 64. From the simulation, it was observed that the model with 10 neurons in hidden layer, 8 clusters, and learning rate = 0.1 performs best in terms of detection accuracy. Confusion matrix values obtained during the experiments for SVM are shown in Table XI . From the experiments, the detection accuracy achieved for SVM classifier was seen to be 90%.
Normal Attack
A three layer MLP neural network was simulated. Resilient Back Propagation algorithm was used as a base classifier. Simulation experiments were carried out to find the number of nodes in hidden layer by varying the values from 10 to 40 in increments of 10. The performance of the learning rate is evaluated by varying the L r from 0.1 to 1.0. Confusion matrix values obtained Table XIII . From the experiments conducted, the detection accuracy was seen to be 91%. K-Nearest Neighbor classifies a sample based on the majority vote of their nearest neighbors. Simulation experiments were conducted and from the results tabulated in Table XV , it is evident that more detection accuracy of 90.3% was obtained when k=11. Confusion matrix values obtained during the experiments for K-NN are shown in Table XIV .
From the experiments conducted for different classifiers for DS2, it is evident from Table XV that the best classifier for dataset DS2 is MLP with high detection accuracy of 93.3%. The obtained best classifier is added to the ensemble. The third experiment was conducted to select the classifier that performed best in identifying the HTTP flood attacks. The experiments conducted in this Section are similar to the experiments conducted in Section IV.A and Section IV.B but with a difference in inputs. Inputs given to the classifiers are the normal traffic and HTTP flood attack traffic dataset. The same five classification algorithms were tested and the results are tabulated in Table XXI . C4.5 finds the normalized information gain for each feature. Confusion matrix values obtained during the experiments for C4.5 decision tree are shown in Table  XVI . From the experiments, the detection accuracy achieved for the best decision tree classifier was seen to be 89%. In Naïve Bayes, confusion matrix values obtained during the experiments are shown in Table XIX . From the experiments conducted, the detection accuracy was seen to be 91.67%. K-Nearest Neighbor (K-NN) classifies a sample based on the majority vote of their nearest neighbors. The neighbors were identified with the representation of samples in multidimensional feature space. As it is binary classification problem, the K values were varied in odd numbers ranging 11, 21, 31, and 41. 
EXPERIMENT RESULTS FOR DS2
D. Observation from the Experiments 1, 2, and 3
The data consists of approximately 1 million preprocessed data packets. Five different machine learning algorithms were compared. After being trained with the training data, each model was evaluated with testing samples. In our simulation experiments, the dataset was split into training dataset and testing dataset. The testing dataset was served as completely unseen samples to the trained ensemble. Testing dataset contained some new attack patterns which were not included in the training dataset and poses a challenge to test the ability of M 2 KMix algorithm in detecting the new attack types.
From the experiments, it was evident that the trained ensembles were able to detect new attacks. During training, the false positives were more and with successive rounds of boosting the network, the false positives were reduced gradually. When learning rate for MLP was too small, it took very long time to reach the global minimum. When learning rate was large, the gradient descent overshoot the maximum diverge and hence moved away from the local minimum. The number of hidden neurons which resulted in the minimum Generalization Error has been chosen as the optimal value in MLP algorithm. From the experimental studies, it was observed that setting more number of neurons in hidden layer resulted in Overfitting and less number of neurons resulted in Underfitting. The decision boundary became very complicated emphasizing very local changes of the class distributions for experiments conducted for Dataset 1. Eventually, MLP returns the network with lowest mean square error (MSE) on the testing set and the decision boundaries obtained from our experiment for MLP are visualized in Figure 8 . MLP does not overfit training data when trained for a large number of epochs. 10 hidden units were used and the optimizations run for 1000 iterations. Similarly, among the set of experiments conducted for Dataset 2, MLP performed well in classifying the normal and attack traffic patterns and the decision boundaries are visualized as shown in Figure 9 . But, for Dataset 3, K-NN classifier performed well in classifying the patterns than MLP and other ML algorithms. The decision boundary for K-NN classifier is shown in Figure 10 . It can be seen from Figure 8 , 9, and 10 that some normal samples are classified incorrectly as attack samples. These misclassifications were overcome when M 2 KMix algorithm is combined with our proposed PA rule, which will be explained in Section IV.E. Due to space limitations, we restrict the classifier decision figures to only the best classifiers. The soft decisions output by three classifiers were then fused using existing classifier combination strategies. Four existing output combination methods such as product, minimum, mean, and maximum were applied under the assumption of equal priors and their results were compared. None of the existing output combination methods were able to improve the detection accuracy and decrease the classification error. The reasons are as follows: For example, suppose the first classifier class. If max, prod, and sum rules are used, this instance will be misclassified as normal class as more votes are assigned for the normal traffic. Thus the existing rules fail to detect the given instance as SYN flood attack. In another instance, suppose the first classifier identifies the instance as normal class and the other two classifiers identify the instance as attack class. If min rule is chosen, the instance is misclassified as normal class. Hence, it may also fail to detect UDP and HTTP flood attacks. The results using these rules are not better than any of the individual classifiers in the ensemble as well. None of the existing output combination rules produced best identification results. It is evident from Table XXII that the detection accuracy is less for the existing fusion methods. Unlike the existing methods, the proposed PA rule gives weightage to the classifier identifying the instance as attack type (S, U, or H). By using our proposed PA rule, highest detection accuracy was obtained for all the three flooding attacks as shown in Table XXII Our proposal differs from the existing methods in feature selection, error cost reduction, and attack type identification. The performance of the ensemble of MLP+KNN classifiers was evaluated based on the testing dataset which contains attack types not included in the training set. From the simulation experiments, it was evident that the trained ensembles were able to detect new attacks. Hence, the Learning ensemble learns the new data without forgetting the previously acquired knowledge, discarding the existing classifier, and retraining a new one.
As less number of features was selected for classification, the proposed M 2 KMix attack identification algorithm is suitable for real time detection system. The focus in this paper is to identify the type of flooding attack and to minimize the false alarms. From the simulation results, it has been found that the proposed M 2 KMix attack type identification algorithm results in high detection accuracy of 97.8%. It has been found that M 2 KMix algorithm identifies three types of flooding attacks, the SYN Flood (100%), UDP flood (93.75%), and HTTP Flood (97.5%), effectively. 
